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Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events,
introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules
compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal
treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. We also show further interest-
ing features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then
a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that
are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides
rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.
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1 Introduction
The sale of broadcasting and media rights is currently the biggest source of revenue for most
sports organizations. This sale is often carried out through some sort of collective bargaining
involving all participating organizations (teams) in a given competition on the one hand, and
broadcasting companies on the other hand. Thus, an ensuing key problem arises in which the
revenues collected from the sale have to be shared among the teams. This is, by no means,
a straightforward problem, mostly because the individual contribution to the revenues is not
known. Furthermore, the revenue is sizable, which renders the solution of the problem crucial
for the management of most sports organizations.
In a recent paper (Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2019), we introduce a formal model
to analyze this problem. Therein, two focal and somewhat polar rules stand out. On the
one hand, the so-called equal-split rule which splits the audience of each game equally among
the two teams.1 On the other hand, the so-called concede-and-divide, which concedes each
team the audience coming from its fan base (the loyal viewers watching all games played by
that team) and divides equally the residual. The two rules have distinguishing merits, but
they treat fans in two opposite and somewhat extreme ways. More precisely, the equal-split
rule essentially ignores the existence of fan bases as it considers, de facto, that both teams
participating in a game contributed equally to the revenues collected from broadcasting that
game. On the other hand, concede-and-divide essentially ignores the existence of casual viewers
as it considers, de facto, that viewers watching a game are either fans of one participating
team, or compulsive viewers, who watch all games in the season. Reality seems to be somewhat
in between and compromising between both rules, which provide meaningful lower and upper
bounds (depending on whether the team has a weak or strong fan base), seems to be a natural
move.
We take in this paper the axiomatic approach and consider three basic and intuitive axioms
for allocation rules, satised by the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide: equal treatment of
equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. The rst one says that if two teams have the same
audiences, then they should receive equal amounts. The second one says that revenues should
1As we shall argue later, revenues can be reduced to audiences provided one assumes a constant pay-per-view
fee for each game.
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be additive on audiences.2 The third axiom says that no team can receive more than its claim,
i.e., the total revenue obtained from all the games in which the team was involved. We show
that these three axioms, which seem to be innocuous independently, have a strong bite when
combined as they actually characterize a family of rules that o¤er a compromise between the
previous two rules. This is the main result of our paper.
Each rule in the family we characterize is simply dened by a certain convex combination
of the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. More precisely, for a given parameter  2
[0; 1], the rule R selects, for each problem, the convex combination of the solutions suggested
by the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide for that problem, with weights  and 1   ,
respectively. Note that, when the set of options is equipped with a convex structure (as in
this case), averaging between di¤erent positions that people may take concerning the best way
of approaching problems is an appealing way of nding some common ground between them.3
What is remarkable in our setting is that this position is normatively supported by three simple
and intuitive principles, as our characterization shows.
We then explore the family so derived and discover further interesting features of it.
First, we show that, if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority
voting equilibrium exists, i.e., a rule that cannot be overturned by any other rule within the
family through majority rule. This is a consequence of the fact that the rules within the family
satisfy the so-called single-crossing property, which allows one to separate those teams who
benet from the application of one rule or the other, depending on the rank of their claims.4
Second, we show that the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked
according to the Lorenz dominance criterion, the most fundamental principle for the evaluation
of inequality (e.g., Dasgupta, Sen and Starret, 1973). More precisely, for each problem, and
each pair of rules within the family, the outcome suggested by the rule associated with a higher
parameter dominates (in the sense of Lorenz) the outcome suggested by the other rule, which
is equivalent to saying that the former will be more egalitarian than the latter. Thus, the
2An interpretation is that the aggregation of the revenue sharing in two seasons (involving the same teams)
is equivalent to the revenue sharing in the hypothetical combined season aggregating the audiences of the
corresponding games in both seasons.
3The idea of averaging as a means of compromising is a recurrent theme in game theory and the theory of
resource allocation (e.g., Thomson, 2018).
4It is well known that a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is that voters
exhibit intermediate preferences over the set of alternatives (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996).
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parameter describing the family allows for the control of the relative equality of the outcomes,
for any problem.
One-parameter families such as the one we derive in this paper have been frequently singled
out in the literature. For instance, in the literature on the measurement of income inequality,
Atkinson (1970) famously introduced a family of inequality measures, characterized by a weight-
ing parameter measuring aversion to inequality. Somewhat related, Donalson and Weymark
(1980) generalized the social-evaluation function corresponding to the focal Gini inequality in-
dex to derive the well-known (one-parameter) family of generalized Gini inequality indices.5 In
a context more similar to ours, Moulin (1987) characterized a family compromising between
the equal and proportional surplus sharing methods. As a matter of fact, his family is the
convex combination of those two methods and one of the axioms used for its characterization is
precisely additivity. Thus, the parallelism with our result is strong.6 Compromises between the
proportional and constrained equal-award rules (thus, satisfying the standard non-negativity
condition for claims problems) have also been considered by Thomson (2015a,b). And alterna-
tive compromises between the proportional rule and the so-called Talmud rule (e.g., Aumann
and Maschler, 1985) have been explored by Moreno-Ternero and Thomson (2017). Finally,
Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) introduced a one-parameter family of rules for claims prob-
lems generalizing the Talmud rule and encompassing (as extreme cases) the polar constrained
equal-awards and constrained equal-losses rules. The rules within such a family also happen
to satisfy the single-crossing property and be fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance
criterion (e.g., Moreno-Ternero, 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. We
present the axiomatic characterization leading to the family in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted
to explore additional properties of the rules within the family. In Section 5, we apply the family
to the case of the Spanish Football League and apply the rules of our family to explore several
allocation schemes therein. We also contrast them with the current scheme being implemented
by the Spanish National Professional Football League Association. We conclude in Section 6.
5See also Weymark (1981), Donalson and Weymark (1983), and Bossert (1990).
6Something similar happens in minimum cost spanning tree problems, where Trudeau (2014) characterizes
the convex combination of the folk rule (e.g., Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga, 2007) and the so-called cycle-complete
rule (e.g., Trudeau, 2002), also making use of additivity.
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2 The model
We consider the model introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). Let N describe
a nite set of teams. Its cardinality is denoted by n. We assume n  3. For each pair of teams
i; j 2 N , we denote by aij the broadcasting audience (number of viewers) for the game played
by i and j at is stadium. We use the notational convention that aii = 0, for each i 2 N .
Let A 2 Ann denote the resulting matrix of broadcasting audiences generated in the whole
tournament involving the teams within N .7
Let i (N;A) denote the total audience achieved by team i, i.e.,
i (N;A) =
X
j2N
(aij + aji):
Without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated from each viewer to 1 (to be
interpreted as the pay per viewfee). Thus, we sometimes refer to i (N;A) by the claim of
team i. When no confusion arises, we write i or i (A) instead of i (N;A).
For each (N;A) 2 P, we dene  as the average audience of all teams. Namely,
 =
P
i2N
i
n
:
For each A 2 Ann, let jjAjj denote the total audience of the tournament. Namely,
jjAjj =
X
i;j2N
aij =
1
2
X
i2N
i =
n
2
:
A (broadcasting) problem is a pair (N;A), where A 2 Ann is dened as above. The
family of all the problems is denoted by P.
A (sharing) rule is a mapping that associates with each problem the list of the amounts
the teams get from the total revenue. Thus, formally, R : P ! Rn is such that, for each
(N;A) 2 P, X
i2N
Ri (N;A) = jjAjj:
7We are therefore assuming a tournament in which each team plays each other team twice: once home,
another away. Our model could be extended to tournaments in which some teams play other teams a di¤erent
number of times. In such a case, aij would denote the broadcasting audience in all games played by i and j at
is stadium.
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Two rules stand out as focal for this problem (e.g., Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2019).
The equal-split rule, which splits equally the audience of each game (among the two teams),
and concede-and-divide, which takes into account the number of fans of each team. They are
dened in a similar way. First, each team i tentatively receives its claim (i). Second, they
each subtract from it an amount associated to the remaining n   1 teams. In the case of
the equal-split rule, an equal share of half of the teams total audience (i =
i=2
n 1 ); in the
case of concede-and-divide, the average audience per game that the remaining teams played
(i =
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk+akj)
(n 2)(n 1) ).
8 Formally,
Equal-split rule, ES: for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ESi (N;A) = i   (n  1)i =
i
2
:
Concede-and-divide, CD: for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi (N;A) = i   (n  1)i =
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2 :
We now consider a family of rules that o¤er a compromise between the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide. They are dened as convex combinations of the two rules. Formally,
EC-family,

EC
	
2[0;1]: for each  2 [0; 1] ; each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ECi (N;A) = ESi (N;A) + (1  )CDi (N;A) :
At the risk of stressing the obvious, note that when  = 0 then EC coincides with concede-
and-divide, whereas when  = 1 then EC coincides with the equal-split rule. That is, EC0 
CD and EC1  ES.
8The term concede-and-divide, which was coined by Thomson (2013) in a di¤erent setting, is justied here
by an intuitive procedure, based on a form of statistical estimation aiming to capture the loyal viewers of each
team, which leads to this rule (see Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019) for further details).
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Note also that, for each (N;A) 2 P, each i 2 N , and each  2 [0; 1] ;
ECi (N;A) = 
i
2
+ (1  )(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
= 
i
2
+ (1  )(n  1)i  
n
2

n  2
= 
i
2
+ (1  )2ni   2i   n
2 (n  2)
= 
i
2
+ (1  )n (i   )
2 (n  2) + (1  )
(n  2)i
2 (n  2)
=
i
2
+
n(1  )
2 (n  2) (i   ) : (1)
3 A characterization
We now introduce three natural axioms for rules.
The rst axiom is a minimal requirement of impartiality, a basic requirement of justice (e.g.,
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006). It says that if two teams have equal audience, then they
should receive equal amounts.
Equal treatment of equals: For each (N;A) 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N such that
aik = ajk, and aki = akj, for each k 2 N n fi; jg,
Ri(N;A) = Rj(N;A):
The second axiom says that revenues should be additive on A. This is an axiom with a
long tradition in axiomatic work (e.g., Shapley, 1953). In our setting, among other things, it
precludes the allocation of revenue aij to depend on any other information contained in the
matrix A. Formally,
Additivity: For each pair (N;A) and (N;A0) 2 P,
R (N;A+ A0) = R (N;A) +R (N;A0) :
The next axiom says that each team should receive, at most, the total audience of the
games played by the team. It therefore formalizes a natural upper bound, akin to the standard
requirement of claims boundedness for the problem of adjudicating conicting claims (e.g.,
ONeill, 1982; Thomson, 2018).
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Maximum aspirations: For each (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(N;A)  i:
Our next result says that just the three previous axioms together characterize the EC family
of rules. This is remarkable as the three axioms are intuitive and basic and none of them seem
to convey strong implications or have a avor reminiscent of the rules.
Theorem 1 A rule satises additivity, equal treatment of equals, and maximum aspirations if
and only if it is an EC rule.
Proof. In Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019), we prove that the rules ES and CD satisfy
the three axioms. As, for each  2 [0; 1] ; EC = ES + (1  )CD; it is straightforward to
see that each rule within the EC-family also satises the three axioms.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let (N;A) 2 P. For each pair
i; j 2 N , with i 6= j, let 1ij denote the matrix with the following entries:
1ijkl =
8<: 1 if (k; l) = (i; j)0 otherwise.
Notice that 1ijji is the zero matrix, i.e., the matrix with only zero entries.
Let k 2 N: By additivity,
Rk (N;A) =
X
i;j2N :i6=j
aijRk
 
N; 1ij

: (2)
By equal treatment of equals, for each pair k; l 2 N n fi; jg we have that Ri (N; 1ij) =
Rj (N; 1
ij) = xij, and Rk (N; 1ij) = Rl (N; 1ij) = zij. As
P
k2N Rj (N; 1
ij) = jj1ijjj = 1 we
deduce that
zij =
1  2xij
n  2 :
Let k 2 N n fi; jg. By additivity, Rj
 
N; 1ij + 1ik

= xij + zik, and Rk
 
N; 1ij + 1ik

=
zij + xik. By equal treatment of equals, Rj
 
N; 1ij + 1ik

= Rk
 
N; 1ij + 1ik

. Thus,
xij +
1  2xik
n  2 = x
ik +
1  2xij
n  2 ,
(n  2)xij + 1  2xik = (n  2)xik + 1  2xij ,
xij = xik
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Thus, there exists x 2 R such that for each fi; jg  N;
Ri
 
N; 1ij

= Rj
 
N; 1ij

= x, and
Rl
 
N; 1ij

=
1  2x
n  2 for each l 2 N n fi; jg:
Let k 2 N . By (2),
Rk (N;A) = kx+ (jjAjj   k) 1  2x
n  2
= kx+ (2x  1)

(n  1)k   jjAjj
n  2   k

= kx+ (2x  1)CDk (N;A)  (2x  1)k
=
k
2
2 (x  2x+ 1) + (2x  1)CDk (N;A)
= (2  2x)ES (N;A) + (2x  1)CDk (N;A) :
Let fi; j; lg  N be a set of three di¤erent teams. By maximum aspirations,
x = Ri
 
N; 1ij
  i  1ij = 1 and
1  2x
n  2 = Rl
 
N; 1ij
  l  1ij = 0:
Thus, 1
2
 x  1. Let  = 2  2x. Then, 1   = 2x  1: As x ranges from 1=2 to 1, it then
follows that  ranges from 0 to 1. Consequently,
Rk (N;A) = ESk (N;A) + (1  )CDk (N;A) = ECk (N;A) ;
as desired.
Remark 1 The axioms of Theorem 1 are independent.
Let R1 be the rule that arises as a convex combination between the equal split rule and
concede-and-divide, but with the (endogenous) weight obtained by the ratio between the maximum
audience and the overall audience. Formally, for each problem (N;A) 2 P, let A = maxi;j2Naij.
Then, for each i 2 N ,
R1i (N;A) =
A
jjAjjESi (N;A) +

1 
A
jjAjj

CDi (N;A) :
R1 satises equal treatment of equals and maximum aspirations, but not additivity.
Let R2 be the rule in which, for each game (i; j) 2 N N , the revenue aij goes to the team
with the lowest number of the two. Namely, for each problem (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N;
R2i (N;A) =
X
j2N :j>i
(aij + aji):
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R2 satises maximum aspirations and additivity, but not equal treatment of equals.
The uniform rule, which divides the total audience equally among the teams, satises addi-
tivity and equal treatment of equal, but not maximum aspirations.
Theorem 1 shows that the family of EC rules is characterized only by three basic and
intuitive axioms, which, when combined, have strong implications to single out a one-parameter
family ranging from the equal-split rule to concede-and-divide.
In Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019), we characterize the equal-split rule as the unique
rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, additivity, and the so-called null team axiom, which
states that teams generating null audiences in all the games receive nothing. We also char-
acterize concede-and-divide as the unique rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, additivity,
and the so-called essential team axiom, which states that teams without whom game audiences
are null receive their whole audience. Obviously, it follows from Theorem 1 that no other rule
within the family of EC rules, di¤erent from the equal-split rule, satises null team. Likewise,
no other rule within the family, di¤erent from concede-and-divide, satises essential team.
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we can give a characterization of the equal-split rule al-
ternative to the one provided in Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019) by replacing the null
team axiom by the combination of maximum aspirations and non negativity. Formally,
Non negativity. For each (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri (N;A)  0:
Corollary 1 A rule satises additivity, equal treatment of equals, maximum aspirations and
non negativity if and only if it is the equal-split rule.
Proof. By Theorem 1, we know that the equal-split rule satises equal treatment of equals,
additivity and maximum aspirations. It is obvious that it also satises non negativity.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the four properties. By Theorem 1, R belongs to the
EC-family. Thus, there exists  2 [0; 1] such that, for each (N;A) 2 P,
R (N;A) = ES (N;A) + (1  )CD (N;A) :
Suppose, by contradiction, that  < 1. Then,
R3
 f1; 2; 3g ; 112 = (1  ) ( 1) < 0;
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which contradicts non negativity. Thus,  = 1 and, hence, R  ES:
Now, given a problem (N;A) 2 P, and i 2 N , one might be interested in identifying the set
of rules within the family that yield a positive amount to team i. Here is a clear-cut answer to
that question:
Proposition 1 For each (N;A) 2 P and each i 2 N , we have the following:
(a) If i  ; then ECi (N;A)  0; for each  2 [0; 1].
(b) If i < ; then ECi (N;A)  0 if and only if
  1  (n  2)i
n (  i) :
Proposition 1 says that for each rule within the family, teams with an audience above average
will get a non-negative amount under. Teams with an audience below average will get a non-
negative amount depending on the relationship between i and : When i is relatively small
with respect to , we need a larger  for non-negativity. The only case always guaranteeing a
non-negative allocation to each agent is  = 1, as stated in Corollary 1.
Proof. Let (N;A) 2 P, i 2 N , and  2 [0; 1]. By equation (1) ; ECi (N;A)  0 if and only if

i
2
+ (1  ) (n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2  0:
Or, equivalently,
(n  2)i + 2 (1  ) [(n  1)i   jjAjj]  0:
As
jjAjj =
P
i2N
i
2
; and  =
P
i2N
i
n
;
we deduce that
jjAjj = n
2
:
Then, ECi (N;A)  0 if and only if
(n  2)i + 2 (1  )

(n  1)i   n
2

 0:
Equivalently,
ni   2i + 2ni   2i   2ni + 2i   n+ n  0;
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or
n (  i)  n  2ni + 2i: (3)
We now consider three cases:
Case i > :
In this case, (3) is equivalent to
  n  2ni + 2i
n (  i) = 1 
(n  2)i
n (  i) :
As   i < 0 we deduce that
1  (n  2)i
n (  i)  1;
and hence (3) holds for any  2 [0; 1] :
Case i = :
In this case, (3) is equivalent to 0  (2  n)i; which always holds.
Case i < :
In this case, (3) is equivalent to
  n  2ni + 2i
n (  i) = 1 
(n  2)i
n (  i) ;
as stated in the proposition.
4 Further insights
We concentrate in this section on the family just characterized and explore further properties
of it. We rst study teamspreferences with respect to the rules within the family. Then, we
turn to the distributional e¤ects of those rules.
In what follows, we assume, without loss of generality, that, for each (N;A) 2 P, N =
f1; : : : ; ng and 1  2      n, with at least one strict inequality.9
9Otherwise, the problem would be trivially solved, as all rules within our family would yield the same
allocation.
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4.1 Majority preferences
We begin by showing that the rules within the EC-family satisfy the so-called single-crossing
property.10 Formally,
Proposition 2 Let 0  1  2  1, and (N;A) 2 P. Then, there exists i 2 N such that:
(i) EC1i (N;A)  EC2i (N;A) for each i = 1; :::; i and
(ii) EC1i (N;A)  EC2i (N;A) for each i = i + 1; :::; n.
Proof. Let 0  1  2  1, and (N;A) 2 P.
We consider two cases:
1. Case i  : In this case,
EC1i (N;A) =
i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2) (i   )
=
i
2
+
n(1   1)
2 (n  2) (  i)
 i
2
+
n(2   1)
2 (n  2) (  i)
= EC2i (N;A):
2. Case i > : In this case,
EC1i (N;A) =
i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2) (i   )
 i
2
+
n(1  2)
2 (n  2) (i   )
= EC2i (N;A):
It turns out that i is precisely the team whose overall audience is closest (from below) to
the average overall audience.
Given a problem (N;A) 2 P we say that EC (N;A) is a majority winner (within the EC-
family) for (N;A) if there is no other rule EC
0
(within the family) such that EC
0
i (N;A) >
ECi (N;A) for a majority of teams. That is, there is no other rule EC
0 (within the family)
such thatni 2 N : EC0i (N;A) > ECi (N;A)o > ni 2 N : EC0i (N;A)  ECi (N;A)o :
10This feature is also shared by the one-parameter rule of taxation methods introduced by Moreno-Ternero
(2011).
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We say that the family of EC rules has a majority voting equilibrium if there is at least one
majority winner (within the EC-family) for each problem (N;A) 2 P.
It is well known that the single-crossing property of preferences is a su¢ cient condition for
the existence of a majority voting equilibrium (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996). Thus, we have the
following corollary from Proposition 2.
Corollary 2 There is a majority voting equilibrium for the family of EC rules.
We now study which specic EC rule could be a majority winner for each problem. We
obtain three di¤erent scenarios, depending on the characteristics of the problem at stake. For
some problems, only the equal-split rule is a majority winner. For some problems, only concede-
and-divide is a majority winner. For the remainder of the problems, each EC rule is a majority
winner.
For each (N;A) 2 P, we consider the following partition of N , with respect to the average
claim ():
Nl (A) = fi 2 N : i < g;
Nu (A) = fi 2 N : i > g; and
Ne (A) = fi 2 N : i = g:
When no confusion arises, we simply write Nl, Nu; and Ne.
Proposition 3 Let (N;A) 2 P. The following statements hold:
(i) If jNlj > jNuj+ jNej, then ES (N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If jNuj > jNlj+ jNej, then CD (N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) Otherwise, each EC (N;A) is a majority winner.
Proof. Let 0    1, and (N;A) 2 P. By (1), for each i 2 N ,
ECi (N;A) =
i
2
+
n(1  )
2 (n  2) (i   ) :
If i < , then ECi (N;A) is an increasing function of , thus maximized at  = 1. This
implies that, for each i 2 Nl, ESi(N;A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided
by the family).
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If i > , then ECi (N;A) is a decreasing function of , thus maximized at  = 0. This
implies that, for each i 2 Nu, CD(N;A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided
by the family).
If i = ; then ECi (N;A) =
i
2
for each  2 [0; 1] : this implies that, for each i 2 Ne, all
rules in the family yield the same outcome.
From the above, statements (i) and (ii) follow trivially. Assume, by contradiction, that
statement (iii) does not hold. Then, there exists (N;A) 2 P and  2 [0; 1] such that EC is not
a majority winner for (N;A) : Thus, we can nd 0 2 [0; 1] such that EC0i (N;A) > ECi (N;A)
holds for the majority of the teams. We then consider two cases:
Case 0 > .
In this case, EC
0
i (N;A) > EC

i (N;A) if and only if i 2 Nl: Now,
jNlj =
ni 2 N : EC0i (N;A) > ECi (N;A)o
>
ni 2 N : EC0i (N;A)  ECi (N;A)o
= jNuj+ jNej
which is a contradiction.
Case 0 < .
In this case, EC
0
i (N;A) > EC

i (N;A) if and only if i 2 Nu: Now,
jNuj =
ni 2 N : EC0i (N;A) > ECi (N;A)o
>
ni 2 N : EC0i (N;A)  ECi (N;A)o
= jNlj+ jNej
which is a contradiction.
The previous results imply that if the distribution of claims is skewed to the left, then
the equal-split allocation is the majority winner, whereas if it is skewed to the right, then the
concede-and-divide allocation is the majority winner. If it is not skewed, then any allocation
within the family can be a majority winner.
The single-crossing property of preferences also guarantees that the social preference rela-
tionship obtained under majority voting is transitive, and corresponds to the median voters. In
our setting, the median voter corresponds to the team with the median overall audience (claim).
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Depending on whether the number of teams is odd or even, the median can be uniquely deter-
mined or not. To avoid ambiguity, we consider in each case the median to be the mean of the
two middle values. Formally, the median overall audience is dened by
m =
8<: n+12 if n is odd1
2

n
2
+ n+2
2

otherwise.
Depending on whether this median overall audience is below or above the average audience,
the median voters preferred rule (and, thus, the majority winner) will either be the equal-split
rule or concede-and-divide. More precisely,
Corollary 3 Let (N;A) 2 P be such that n is odd. The following statements hold:
(i) If m < , then ES(N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If m > , then CD(N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If m = , then any EC(N;A) is a majority winner.
Proof. If m < , then jNlj  m. Hence jNlj > jNuj + jNej : By Proposition 3, statement (i)
holds.
If m > , then jNuj  m. Hence jNuj > jNlj + jNej : By Proposition 3, statement (ii)
holds.
If m = , then jNlj < m; jNuj < m; and jNej > 0. Hence, we are in case (iii) of the
statement of Proposition 3, which concludes the proof.
Corollary 4 Let (N;A) 2 P be such that n is even. The following statements hold:
(i) If n+2
2
< , then ES(N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If n
2
> , then CD(N;A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If n
2
   n+2
2
, then any EC(N;A) is a majority winner.
Proof. If n+2
2
< , then jNlj  m. Hence jNlj > jNuj+ jNej : By Proposition 3, statement (i)
holds.
If n
2
> , then jNuj  m. Hence jNuj > jNlj + jNej : By Proposition 3, statement (ii)
holds.
Suppose now that n
2
   n+2
2
: Then, it is enough to prove that we are in case (iii) of
the statement of Proposition 3. That is, we have to prove that neither jNlj > jNuj + jNej nor
jNuj > jNlj+ jNej hold. We consider several subcases:
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1. If  = n
2
, then jNlj < n2 , jNuj  n2 and jNej > 0.
2. If n
2
<  < n+2
2
, then jNlj = n2 , jNuj = n2 and jNej = 0.
3. If  = n+2
2
, then jNlj  n2 , jNuj < n2 and jNej > 0.
In either case, the desired conclusion holds.
4.2 On the distributive power of the rules
We now turn to the distributional e¤ects of the rules within the family. More precisely, we
show that the rules within the family are completely ranked according to the so-called Lorenz
dominance criterion, the most fundamental criterion of income inequality.
Formally, given x; y 2 Rn satisfying x1  x2  :::  xn, y1  y2  :::  yn, and
Pn
i=1 xi =Pn
i=1 yi, we say that x is greater than y in the Lorenz ordering if
Pk
i=1 xi 
Pk
i=1 yi, for each
k = 1; :::; n   1, with at least one strict inequality. This criterion induces a partial ordering
on allocations which reects their relative spread. When x is greater than y in the Lorenz
ordering, the distribution x is unambiguously more egalitarianthan the distribution y (e.g.,
Dasgupta, Sen and Starret, 1973).
In our setting, we say that a rule R is more egalitarian than another R0 if for each
(N;A) 2 P, R(N;A) is greater than R0(N;A) in the Lorenz ordering.
As mentioned above, the Lorenz ordering is only a partial ordering. Thus, one should not
expect many rules to be ranked according to the egalitarian criterion just described. Neverthe-
less, as the next result shows, the rules within the EC-family are fully ranked according to the
parameter that denes the family.11 This parameter can therefore be interpreted as an index
of the distributive power of the rule.
Proposition 4 If 0  1  2  1 then, EC2 is more egalitarian than EC1.
Proof. Let (N;A) 2 P.
We rst prove that ES (N;A) is greater than CD (N;A) in the Lorenz ordering.
Let i 2 N: By equation (1),
CDi (N;A) =
i
2
+
n
2 (n  2) (i   ) :
11Although we provide a direct proof for this result, it can also be derived as a consequence of Proposition 2.
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Thus,
ES1 (N;A)  ES2 (N;A)  :::  ESn (N;A) and
CD1 (N;A)  CD2 (N;A)  :::  CDn (N;A) : (4)
It then su¢ ces to show that, for each k = 1; :::; n  1,
kX
i=1
i
2

kX
i=1

i
2
+
n
2 (n  2) (i   )

:
But this is simply a consequence of the fact that
kX
i=1
i  k;
for each k = 1; :::; n  1.
We now prove that EC2 (N;A) is greater than EC1 (N;A) for each 0  1  2  1. By
(4), we have that
EC11 (N;A)  EC12 (N;A)  :::  EC1n (N;A) and
EC21 (N;A)  EC22 (N;A)  :::  EC2n (N;A) :
Then, it su¢ ces to show that, for each k = 1; :::; n  1,
kX
i=1
EC2i (N;A) 
kX
i=1
EC1i (N;A) :
Now,
kX
i=1

i
2
+
n(1  2)
2 (n  2) (i   )


kX
i=1

i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2) (i   )

,
kX
i=1
n(1  2)
2 (n  2) (i   ) 
kX
i=1
n(1  1)
2 (n  2) (i   ),
(1  2)
kX
i=1
(i   )  (1  1)
kX
i=1
(i   ) :
As
kP
i=1
(i   )  0 and 1  2, the above follows.
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5 An empirical application
In this section, we present an empirical application of our model resorting to La Liga, the
Spanish Football League.
La Liga is a standard round robin tournament involving 20 teams. Thus, each team plays 38
games, facing each time one of the other 19 teams (once home, another away). The 20 teams,
and the overall audience (in millions) of each team during the season 2017-2018, are listed in
the rst two columns of Table 1.12
Insert Table 1 about here
Note that the total audience of the entire season is 197; 05 millions, and the total revenue
was 1325; 6 millions of euros. Thus, in order to accommodate the premises of our model and
identify total audience with total revenue, we have to assume that each viewer paid a pay-per-
view fee of 6:73 euros (instead of only one) per game. This normalizing assumption appears in
Column 3. The resulting scaling will be implicit in the next tables describing the allocations.
Columns 4 and 5 give the allocation put in practice for the season 2017-18 (in millions of
euros and in percentage terms).13 As we can see, two teams (Barcelona and Real Madrid)
dominated the sharing collecting (when combined) almost 23% of the pie.
Table 2 lists again the allocation put in practice for the season 2017-18, but now together
with the ones proposed by the two extreme rules of the EC-family (the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide). In the last column of this table we explore whether the amount obtained
by each team in the allocation used in practice corresponds to some rule in the EC family. For
instance, Barcelona receives the amount that the rule EC0:98 would yield for this setting. In
contrast, Real Madrid receives less than the amount proposed by any rule within the family
because 148 < min f158:43; 260:81g. On the other hand, Atlético de Madrid receives more than
the amount proposed by any rule within the family because 110:60 > max f85:77; 107:43g.
Insert Table 2 about here
12The source for most of the data provided here is Palco 23, the leading newspaper in economic infor-
mation of the sport business in Spain. Palco 23 refers itself to Havas Sports and Entertainment as its source.
See, for instance, https://www.palco23.com/competiciones/del-barca-al-numancia-que-clubes-cobraron-mas-de-
laliga-por-tv.html
13The source is La Ligas website. See, for instance, http://www.laliga.es/lfp/reparto-ingresos-audiovisuales
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Several conclusions can be derived from Table 2. Maybe the most obvious one is that,
contrary to what some might argue, the actual revenue sharing seems to be biased against
the two powerhouses. Barcelona receives approximately the minimum it could receive, whereas
Real Madrid receives even less than the minimum. With concede-and-divide (one of the extreme
rules within the family), Barcelona and Real Madrid together would receive 38:28% of the pie
(instead of the 22:78% they actually receive).
Another conclusion is that nine teams are favored by the actual allocation, in the sense that
the amount each gets is above the amounts suggested by all the rules within the family.
Apart from Real Madrid, only one team (Betis) obtains amounts below those suggested by
the two rules. It is actually a remarkable case, as the allocation yields 3:99%, whereas the two
rules would recommend 7:1% and 9:44%, respectively.
The remaining nine teams obtain amounts that can be rationalized by some rule within the
EC-family. However, the rule would be di¤erent for each team. For instance, for Barcelona,
it would be the rule corresponding to  = 0:98 (which means that it receives something quite
similar to the equal-split outcome) but for Celta, it would be the rule corresponding to  = 0:02
(which means that it receives something quite similar to the concede-and-divide outcome).
In Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019) we essentially divide the viewers of each game
in two categories: fans and no fans. As the name suggests, the former are those watching the
game because they are fans of one of the teams playing. The latter are those watching the game
because they thought that the specic combination of teams rendered the game interesting.
We argue that the revenue generated by a fan should be allocated to the corresponding team,
whereas the revenue generated by the no fans should be divided equally between both teams.
The equal-split rule and concede-and-divide are two extreme rules from the point of view of
treating fans. The former assumes that there are no fans. The latter assumes that there are
as many fans as possible (compatible with the real data). Thus, the allocation obtained by a
team should be somewhat in between the allocations proposed by both rules to such a team.
In practice, we know the total number of viewers of each game, but not the partition in
the two categories mentioned above. Now, it is feasible to estimate the average number of fans
and no fans watching the games. For instance, we can take a sample of viewers and ask them
to report the games they have watched, and if they are fans of some team. Let f denote the
number of people who have watched a game being a fan of some of the teams. Let fn denote
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the number of people who have watched a game without being a fan of any of the teams. Let
us dene  = f
n
f+fn
as the percentage of no fans watching a game. Similarly, 1    = f
f+fn
is
the percentage of fans watching a game. We argue that EC should be a salient rule among
those within the family.
Based on the above, the parameter 1   could be interpreted as the percentage of viewers
who watch a game because they are fans of one of the teams playing the game. Similarly, 
could be interpreted as the percentage of viewers who watch a game without being a fan of one
of the teams playing the game. In the case of Barcelona mentioned above,  = 0:98 indicates
that, among those watching a Barcelona game, there is approximately the same number of
Barcelona fans as of fans for the opposite team. This is quite counterintuitive because the
audiences of Barcelona games are much larger than the audiences of all other games (excluding
those involving Real Madrid).
Table 3 compares the allocation implemented by La Liga with two allocations selected by
rules in our family: ES and EC0:25.
Insert Table 3 about here
The rule EC0:25 was simply chosen based on our intuition. We believe that most of the
viewers of a game are fans of one of the teams. Thus, we chose a relatively small . Never-
theless, and somewhat surprisingly, we obtain that the rule within the EC-family yielding a
closer allocation to the allocation of La Liga (according to the Euclidean distance) is the rule
corresponding to  = 1, i.e., the equal-split rule.
If we compare ES with the allocation implemented in La Liga we realize that one team
(Betis) obtains much less (41 millions of euros). Other nine teams (including Real Madrid) also
obtain less (between 1 and 10 millions). The remaining ten teams (including Barcelona) obtain
more (between 0 and 25 millions).
If we compare EC0:25 with the allocation implemented in La Liga the situation is even
more extreme. Three teams (Barcelona, Betis and Real Madrid) obtain much less (between 64
and 87 millions of euros). One team (Celta) obtains 1.63 millions less. The remaining sixteen
teams obtain more (between 0 and 35 millions). Thus, according to EC0:25, the allocation
implemented by La Liga favors teams with lower audiences.
It has been argued that an extremely unequal sharing of the broadcasting revenues would
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be detrimental to the overall quality of the tournament. Thus, we consider alternative schemes
with our database. More precisely, we present hybrid schemes in which a portion of the overall
revenue is divided equally, another is divided according to performance, and the residual is
divided according to one of our two rules (thus, only taking into account audiences). Note
that this is indeed what happens in most important European football leagues. La Liga itself
implemented a new scheme along those lines, in which half of the overall revenue was shared
equally, whereas one quarter was shared according to league performance and the remaining
quarter according to what they dubbed social relevance. The details of this new scheme, which
was actually sanctioned by the Spanish government, appeared in the O¢ cial Bulletin of the
Spanish State on May 1st, 2015.
Table 4 summarizes the outcomes that the equal-split and concede-and-divide rules would
yield when modied to endorse the hybrid scheme implemented by La Liga. More precisely, we
assume that half of the overall revenue is shared equally (that would represent 33.14 million
euros for each team), whereas one quarter is shared according to league performance and the
remaining quarter according to social performance (where we apply our two rules). By league
performance, La Liga refers to the standings at the end of the previous ve seasons (where a
zero score is given to those teams that played in the second division, or below, in one of those
years). One quarter of the budget is then allocated proportionally to those 5-year standings. By
social performance, La Liga assigns one third (of the corresponding one quarter) proportionally
to the revenues generated from ticket sales in the last ve seasons.14 The other two thirds (of
that one quarter) are supposed to be assigned according to audiences. We then consider our
equal-split and concede-and-divide rules for that portion of the budget. More precisely, the fth
and sixth columns of Table 4 provide the amounts suggested by each rule for the division of
one sixth of the budget, whereas the last two columns are the result of aggregating (for each
team) those amounts with the xed amount (33.14 million) and the proportional amounts to
league performance and ticket sales.
Insert Table 4 about here
14For this, we consider data on season tickets for the last two seasons, which are the only ones available
(again, obtained from Palco 23). See, for instance, https://www.palco23.com/clubes/los-clubes-arrancan-la-liga-
santander-con-cerca-de-600-000-abonados.html and https://www.palco23.com/clubes/los-clubes-de-primera-y-
segunda-rozan-los-800000-abonados-en-2017-2018.html
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An obvious observation to make from Table 4 is that the hybrid schemes become more egali-
tarian. More precisely, under the equal-split rule itself, the two powerhouses obtain (combined)
23:39% of the pie. The hybrid scheme lowers this to 20:46%. Under concede-and-divide itself,
the two powerhouses obtain (combined) 38:27%, which now drastically moves down (under the
hybrid scheme) to 22:95%.
As mentioned above, one sixth of the total budget (around 221 millions of euros) is assigned
according to audiences. In such a case, we can compute directly the equal-split and concede-
and-divide allocations. Besides, if we subtract from the total allocation obtained by each team
the corresponding amounts listed in Columns 2, 3 and 4 from Table 4, we obtain the way
in which La Liga allocates the amount corresponding to audiences among the teams.15 This
appears in Column 4 of Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here
In the last column of Table 5 we perform the same exercise as in Table 2 (mentioned above).
In this case, we observe that six teams are favored by the actual allocation, in the sense that the
amount each gets is above the amounts suggested by any member of the EC-family. Five teams
obtain amounts below those suggested by the members of the EC-family. The remaining nine
teams obtain amounts suggested by the member of the EC-family given by the corresponding
cell in the last column. In this case, the allocation implemented by La Liga does not favor
teams with lower audiences. It seems to be quite uniform in that aspect.
We now obtain that the rule within the EC-family that yields a closer allocation to the
allocation given by Column 4 in Table 5 (according to the Euclidean distance) is the rule
corresponding to  = 0:29. Thus, we compare in Table 6 the allocation being implemented by
La Liga with that provided by EC0:29. One team (Betis) obtains in the allocation implemented
by La Liga around 14 millions of euros less than with EC0:29. Other seven teams also obtain
less (between 1 and 7 millions). The remaining twelve teams (including Barcelona and Real
Madrid) obtain more (between 0 and 5 millions).
Insert Table 6 about here
15Note that the data from Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 are the ones used by La Liga, but the data from
Column 4 are estimations.
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6 Discussion
We have studied the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport events, as recently
introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We have considered three basic and
intuitive axioms for such a problem. Together, the three axioms characterize a family of rules
that o¤er a compromise between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide. As such, the family is exible enough to accommodate a wide variety of
views regarding the existence of fans associated to each participating team. It ranges from the
extreme view that, de facto, dismisses the existence of those fan bases (as exemplied by the
equal-split rule) to the polar (and, thus, extreme too) view that minimizes the number of casual
viewers, who simply watch a game because they are interested into the specic pair of teams
involved in it (as exemplied by concede-and-divide).
We have also shown that the family has other merits. For instance, it constitutes a domain
of rules for which majority voting equilibrium exists. Also, the rules within the family are fully
ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion.
Our family of rules is reminiscent of some other families that have been considered in
the literature on related topics (such as income inequality measurement, surplus sharing, cost
allocation, or claims problems). Some of these families also o¤er compromises between focal
and somewhat polar rules. Others share with ours the structure regarding the order of their
members (according to the spread of the outcomes they yield), or the majority preferences
(with respect to the members of the family).
We have also applied the rules within our family to a real-life situation. More precisely, we
have explored the allocation of the (joint) revenues collected from selling broadcasting rights
in the case of La Liga, the Spanish Football League. Our analysis indicates that the family can
essentially accommodate the real-life outcomes we observe, especially when the rules within
our family are combined with performance measures and lower bounds guaranteed for each
participating team.
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